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ABSTRACT
When a firm is unable to roll over its debt, it may have to seek more expensive sources of financing
or even liquidate its assets. This paper provides a normative analysis of minimizing such rollover risk,
through the optimal dynamic choice of the maturity structure of debt. The objective of a firm with
long-term assets is to maximize the effective maturity of its liabilities across several refinancing cycles,
rather than to maximize the maturity of the current bonds outstanding. An advantage of short-term
financing is that a firm, while in good financial health, can readjust its maturity structure more quickly















yogo@wharton.upenn.eduWe study a simple model of liquidity risk management in which a ﬁrm is subject to
rollover risk. When a ﬁrm is unable to roll over its maturing bonds by issuing new bonds, it
may have to seek more expensive sources of ﬁnancing or even liquidate its assets, possibly
at ﬁre-sale prices. One way to reduce this risk is to hold excess cash reserves, which can
be expensive in practice (Bengt Holmstr¨ om and Jean Tirole 2000; 2001). In this paper, we
focus on an alternative way of managing liquidity risk, through the optimal dynamic choice
of the maturity structure of debt.
Our analysis highlights one advantage of short-term ﬁnancing. The ﬁrm, while in good
ﬁnancial health, can readjust its maturity structure more quickly in response to changes in
its asset value. Ideally, the ﬁrm would secure long-term ﬁnancing just prior to when its
ﬁnancial health may worsen. Through this strategy, the ﬁrm can secure ﬁnancing for the
longest continuous period possible without rollover failure, avoiding ineﬃcient restructuring
costs. Put diﬀerently, the objective of the ﬁrm with long-term assets is to maximize the
eﬀective maturity of its liabilities across several reﬁnancing cycles, rather than to maximize
the maturity of the current bonds outstanding.
Our analysis adds a new dimension to interest-rate risk management (or duration hedg-
ing), which is the traditional method of choosing the maturity structure of debt (Oldrich
Vasicek 1977). Duration hedging shields the ﬁrm’s net worth from (at least small) changes
in interest rates, by matching the interest-rate sensitivity of its liabilities to that of its assets.
In reality, the ﬁrm’s long-term assets are also exposed to sources of risk other than changes
in interest rates. These sources of risk can cause rollover failure that are not hedged by
interest-rate risk management. Our paper provides a normative analysis of liquidity risk
hedging that goes beyond traditional duration hedging. It prescribes the optimal maturity
of debt for a single ﬁrm, taking the supply of credit as exogenously given. Importantly,
we abstract from the role of informational frictions that lead to signalling of credit quality,
which limits the maturity of bonds available to the ﬁrm (Mark J. Flannery 1986; Douglas
W. Diamond 1991). The ﬁrm’s maturity choice can also be limited due to a rat race among
2creditors to shorter and shorter maturity (Markus K. Brunnermeier and Martin Oehmke
2009).
In Section I, we ﬁrst illustrate our main point with a simple three-period example. We de-
velop a more general model of liquidity risk management in Section II. We discuss additional
issues that are outside the scope of our main analysis in Section III.
I. Three-Period Example of Liquidity Risk Manage-
ment
We start with a simple three-period example, which captures the essential insights of the
paper. In order to highlight the diﬀerences from interest-rate risk management, we assume
that the riskless interest rate at all maturities is constant and equal to zero.
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
(3a) 109
(2a) 107 <
(1a) 105 < (3b) 105
103 < (2b) 103 <
(1b) 101 < (3c) 101
(2c) 99 <
(3d) 97
Figure 1: Present Value of the Project’s Payoﬀ in Period 3
Consider a long-term project that costs $100 in period 0. The project matures in period
3 and has payoﬀs given by the binomial model in Figure 1. Prior to maturity, information
about the value of the project is revealed through the binomial model. The probability of
an up/down movement is 0.5 at each node. The present value of the terminal payoﬀ is $103
in period 0, and it changes in increments of ±$2 from one period to the next.
The owner of the project, or the ﬁrm, has no initial capital. Unspeciﬁed incentive con-
straints prevent the ﬁrm from issuing equity. The ability to issue three-period bonds would
solve the ﬁnancing problem trivially. Therefore, we assume that the ﬁrm can only issue zero-
3coupon bonds of one- or two-period maturity. For simplicity, the ﬁrm can ﬁnance itself with
bonds of one type of maturity in any given period, and bonds cannot be repurchased prior
to maturity. For a discussion of ﬁnancing with multiple maturities and repurchases, we refer
the reader to Section III. All bonds are held by a continuum of small, risk-neutral bond-
holders of measure one, who can also invest in a riskless asset. Consequently, bondholders
never accept investment opportunities with negative expected returns.
If the ﬁrm cannot roll over its maturing bonds in any period prior to period 3, it must go
through debt restructuring. We assume that debt restructuring reduces the overall value of
the project by $16. In practice, debt restructuring can be costly for three main reasons. First,
a distinctive feature of bonds, in contrast to loans, is that owners of bonds are dispersed and
typically diﬃcult to locate. This makes renegotiation diﬃcult and potentially costly (e.g.,
see Lee C. Buchheit and G. Mitu Gulati 2002). Second, the ﬁrm may have to resort to more
expensive sources of ﬁnancing subsequent to rollover failure. Finally, the ﬁrm may be forced
to liquidate the project at a ﬁre-sale price in extreme circumstances. In the terminology of
Markus K. Brunnermeier and Lasse Heje Pedersen (2009), the project’s low market liquidity
increases rollover risk, which is a type of funding illiquidity.
In period 0, consider two diﬀerent ﬁnancing strategies. In a “long-short” strategy, the
ﬁrm initially issues two-period bonds, and then rolls them over as one-period bonds from
period 2 to 3. In a “short-long” strategy, the ﬁrm initially issues one-period bonds, and
then rolls them over as two-period bonds from period 1 to 3. Conventional interest-rate
risk management does not give us clear guidance on the optimal ﬁnancing strategy as both
strategies use the same bonds, only in a diﬀerent order. We now show that the short-long
strategy dominates the long-short strategy from the perspective of liquidity risk management.
In fact, the short-long strategy is the only way in which the ﬁrm can successfully ﬁnance the
project in this simple example.
Following the long-short strategy, suppose the two-period bond matures at node (2c),
where the present value of the project is only $99. A debt-overhang problem (Stewart C.
4Myers 1977) prevents the ﬁrm from raising more than $99 at node (2c). Because the ﬁrm
cannot roll over its maturing bonds whose face value is at least $100, the ﬁrm has to go
through costly debt restructuring, which reduces the ﬁrm value to $99 − $16 = $83 at node
(2c). In period 0, the present value of the ﬁrm is therefore no more than 0.25×$107+0.5×
$103 + 0.25 × $83 = $99. Therefore, the ﬁrm is unable to raise the $100 necessary to start
the project.1
In contrast, the short-long strategy leads to successful ﬁnancing until the project’s ma-
turity. Suppose the one-period bond matures at node (1b), where the present value of the
project is $101. The ﬁrm can then issue two-period bonds worth $100, which ensures ﬁnanc-
ing until the project’s maturity. These two-period bonds sell at a discount relative to their
face value of $101, in order to compensate the bondholders for the possibility of default at
node (3d). In period 0, the present value to the bondholders is $100, and the ﬁrm’s net
worth is $3.
II. A Model of Liquidity Risk Management
We now show that the insights of the three-period example extend to an inﬁnite-horizon
binomial model. Our model is a normative model of liquidity risk management in the spirit
of textbook models of interest-rate risk management. Through our model, we are able to
give some guidance on the optimal maturity structure of bonds that minimizes rollover risk.
Time is discrete and indexed by t. The continuously compounded riskless interest rate at
all maturities is constant and equal to r. There is an inﬁnitely lived project whose discounted
value is a martingale,
Xt = Et[e
−rXt+1]. (1)
1Note that the long-short strategy is ineﬃcient even if the debt restructuring cost were signiﬁcantly lower
than $16. With a smaller cost, the ﬁrm can start the project in period 0, but it will be unable to roll over
its bonds at node (2c).
5The value of the project is governed by a geometric binomial process, where the increments
Xt+1/Xt are independently and identically distributed. The project matures at a random
time T, after which the entire value of the project XT becomes pledgable. The distribution
of T is geometric and independent of the value of the project. We use Pr(m)=P r ( T>
t + m|T>t ) to simplify notation.
A ﬁrm must ﬁnance the project through zero-coupon bonds of maturity up to M.W e
continue to assume that the ﬁrm can only issue one type of maturity in any given period,
and that bonds cannot be repurchased prior to maturity. In addition, the ﬁrm cannot store
cash. All bonds are held by a continuum of small risk-neutral bondholders of measure one,
whose continuously compounded expected return is r.
Suppose the project has not matured through period t. In addition, there are outstanding
bonds with face value Ft which mature in period t. Rollover ﬁnancing is feasible whenever
the ﬁrm can raise enough funds, through the issuance of new bonds, to repay the full face
value of maturing bonds. If the ﬁrm fails to roll over its bonds in any period t<Tprior to
the project’s maturity, it must pay a restructuring cost of λXt where λ ∈ (0,1). Let Vt be
the ﬁrm’s borrowing capacity in period t. The ﬁrm can roll over the outstanding bonds if
the rollover constraint is satisﬁed:
Vt ≥ Ft. (2)
Suppose the ﬁrm were to issue bonds of maturity m with face value Ft+m in period t.
The ﬁrm’s borrowing capacity under this policy is
Vt(m)=( 1 − Pr(m))Et[e
−mrXt+m]+P r ( m)Et[e
−mr(Vt+m − 1{Vt+m<Ft+m}λXt+m)] (3)
= Xt +P r ( m)Et[e
−mr(Vt+m − Xt+m − 1{Vt+m<Ft+m}λXt+m)].
This equation says that the current borrowing capacity is the value of the project Xt minus
the present value of future restructuring costs.
6The market value of the m- p e r i o db o n di np e r i o dt is
Dt(m)=( 1 − Pr(m))Et[e
−mr min{Ft+m,X t+m}] (4)
+Pr(m)Et[e
−mr min{Ft+m,V t+m − 1{Vt+m<Ft+m}λXt+m}]
−1{Vt(m)<Ft}λXt.
This equation says that the bond price is its expected payoﬀ upon maturity minus the current
cost of restructuring. If the rollover constraint is satisﬁed in period t, there exists a maturity
m and face value Ft+m such that Dt(m)=Ft. As rollover risk becomes signiﬁcant, the face
value of bonds must rise so that the ﬁrm eﬀectively transfers the equity value of the ﬁrm
to the bondholders. The face value of maturing bonds Ft is an endogenous state variable in
that it depends on the history of ﬁnancing policy.
The value of the ﬁrm in period t, under the policy of issuing m-period bonds, is its
borrowing capacity minus the current restructuring cost if rollover fails, that is Vt(m) −
1{Vt(m)<Ft}λXt. The ﬁrm’s net worth under this policy is Vt(m)−Dt(m)−1{Vt(m)<Ft}λXt.I f
the rollover constraint is satisﬁed, maximizing the ﬁrm’s net worth is equivalent to max-
imizing its borrowing capacity Vt(m) subject to the constraint Dt(m)=Ft.( E v e n i f
rollover is successful in the current period, the ﬁrm’s value is less than the value of the
project Xt because it reﬂects the present value of future restructuring costs.) If the rollover
constraint is not satisﬁed, the ﬁrm must restructure the maturing bonds at market value
Dt(m)=Vt(m)−λXt. In this case, maximizing the bondholder’s present value is equivalent
to maximizing the ﬁrm’s borrowing capacity Vt(m). The choice of optimal maturity, and
corresponding face value Ft+m, leads to the value function
Vt =m a x
m∈{1,...,M}
Vt(m). (5)
Proposition 1. An optimal ﬁnancing strategy is to issue: (i) bonds of the shortest maturity
as long as subsequent rollover is guaranteed and (ii) bonds of the maximum maturity when
7its net worth is zero and debt restructuring is inevitable.
Proposition 1 characterizes the optimal ﬁnancing strategy, which we prove in the Ap-
pendix. To summarize, an optimal ﬁnancing strategy of a long-term asset is to initially roll
over short-term bonds. In particular, the ﬁrm should roll over the one-period bond as long
as rollover is guaranteed in the subsequent period. Through short-term ﬁnancing, the ﬁrm
can remain ﬂexible and react quickly when the value of its assets falls. The ﬁrm should
then hedge liquidity risk, that is secure long-term ﬁnancing, as soon as rollover risk becomes
signiﬁcant. By doing so, the ﬁrm delays the realization of ineﬃcient restructuring costs for as
long as possible. Our proposition does not fully characterize the transition from one-period
bonds to the maximum maturity, which can be accomplished in the continuous-time limit
as the time interval between periods shrinks.
III. Discussion
A. State-Dependent Maximum Maturity
Our analysis so far has assumed that the maximum available maturity is constant and
independent of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial health. In reality, the maximum maturity may decline as
the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial health worsens. This eﬀect can be captured in reduced form by assuming
that the maximum maturity is a declining function of the ﬁrm’s leverage ratio above some
bound (e.g., Mt = M(Ft/Xt), where M  ≤ 0). As shown in the Appendix, a lower maximum
maturity increases the likelihood (or frequency) of debt restructuring prior to the project’s
maturity, thereby reducing ﬁrm value. Therefore, if the maximum maturity is sensitive to
changes in the leverage ratio, the ﬁrm would like to secure long-term ﬁnancing at a lower
leverage ratio than our previous analysis may have suggested.
The relation between the maximum maturity and the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial health can be en-
dogenized by informational frictions that aﬀect the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing options. These frictions
become more important as the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial health worsens because debt becomes more
8sensitive to asymmetric information. More proﬁtable ﬁrms may want to signal their credit-
worthiness by exposing themselves to rollover risk through short-term ﬁnancing. This makes
long-term ﬁnancing more expensive, even to the point that the less proﬁtable ﬁrms choose
to pool with the more proﬁtable ﬁrms (Flannery 1986; Diamond 1991).
B. Financing with Multiple Maturities and Repurchases
In our analysis, we have assumed that the ﬁrm has only bonds of a single maturity outstand-
ing at any point in time. If the ﬁrm can have bonds of multiple maturities outstanding at the
same time, richer ﬁnancing strategies are possible. Returning to the three-period example in
Section I, suppose the ﬁrm initially issues $100 of two-period bonds, and issues an additional
$100 of two-period bonds if it reaches node (1b). That is, the ﬁrm’s liabilities at node (1b)
consists of $100 of bonds with one period until maturity and $100 of bonds with two periods
until maturity. While this strategy allows the ﬁrm to successfully ﬁnance the project until
maturity, it forces the ﬁrm to store cash from node (1b) to period 2. Although storing cash
for precautionary reasons can be optimal in some settings (e.g., Holmstr¨ om and Tirole 2001),
our strategy is more eﬃcient if storing cash is costly (e.g., due to agency costs).
The ﬁrm can avoid storing extra cash if it is allowed to repurchase its outstanding bonds
prior to maturity. At node (1b), the ﬁrm can use the $100 raised through the issuance of
new two-period bonds to retire outstanding bonds that are scheduled to mature in period
2. Consequently, the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between issuing one- or two-period bonds in period
0 once we allow for repurchases. In reality, the repurchase of all outstanding bonds prior
to maturity may be impractical since owners of bonds are often dispersed and diﬃcult to
locate.
C. Maturity Risk Shifting due to Government Guarantees
Our three-period example is also useful for illustrating a form of risk shifting through the
suboptimal choice of bond maturity. At node (2c), the value of the project is $99, which is
9only $1 less than the value necessary to roll over maturing bonds. What is striking about
the situation is that a shortfall in ﬁnancing of a mere $1 causes a wealth destruction of $16.
The government might therefore be tempted to provide a guarantee to the new bondholders
at node (2c), insuring a minimum payoﬀ of $99 in period 3. Such a guarantee creates a
social value of $16 by allowing rollover at node (2c), while costing the government $1 in
expectation.
However, the government guarantee distorts the ex-ante incentives of the ﬁrm. The
presence of the guarantee prevents the ﬁrm from choosing the socially eﬃcient short-long
strategy. Knowing that the government guarantee will allow the ﬁrm to reﬁnance at node
(2c), it is now optimal for the ﬁrm to issue the one-period bond at node (1b), or equivalently
the two-period bond in period 0. By doing so, the ﬁrm triggers a wealth transfer from the
government by forcing the government to absorb the downside.
10Appendix
We prove Proposition 1 in this appendix. We ﬁrst rescale all variables by Xt since the
maximization problem is homogeneous in project value. Let  Vt = Vt/Xt − 1a n d Ft =
Ft/Xt − 1. To simplify notation, let r(m)=r − log(Xt+m/Xt)/m be the riskless interest





=P r ( m)Et[e





=( 1 − Pr(m))Et[e
−mr(m) min{ Ft+m,0}]
+Pr(m)Et[e
−mr(m) min{ Ft+m,  Vt+m − 1{ Vt+m<  Ft+m}λ}]
−1{ Vt(m)<  Ft}λ.
The proof for the ﬁrst part of the proposition follows. Let k<l≤ M,w h e r ek is a
shorter maturity and l is a longer maturity. Assume that rollover is feasible for both bonds
in period t. In order to compare these strategies, it is useful to introduce a hypothetical
third strategy that involves a put option. More speciﬁcally, create a European put option
in period t that settles on the value Vt+k(l − k)i np e r i o dt + k at the exercise price of Ft+k.
The payoﬀ of the put option is max{Ft+k − Vt+k(l − k),0} in period t + k. Now suppose
the ﬁrm follows a hypothetical strategy of ﬁnancing through the k-period bond and the put
option in period t. Upon maturity of the bond in period t+k, the ﬁrm rolls over by issuing
a( l − k)-period bond, the feasibility of which is guaranteed through the put option. The
value of this hypothetical strategy is
 Vt(k,l − k)=P r ( k)Et[e
−kr(k)( Vt+k(l − k)+m a x { Ft+k −  Vt+k(l − k),0})] (8)
=P r ( k)Et[e
−kr(k)max{ Ft+k,  Vt+k(l − k)}].
11We calculate an upper bound on the value of the hypothetical strategy as










=P r ( k)Et[e
−kr(k) Vt+k]= Vt(k).
The second line follows from the assumption  Vt+k ≥  Ft+k that rollover of the k-period bond
is feasible in period t + k. We calculate a lower bound on the value of the hypothetical
strategy as
 Vt(k,l − k) ≥ Pr(k)Et[e
−kr(k) Vt+k(l − k)] (10)
=P r ( k)Et[e
−kr(k) Pr(l − k)Et+k[e
−(l−k)r(l−k)( Vt+l − 1{ Vt+l< Ft+l}λ)]]
=P r ( l)Et[e
−lr(l)( Vt+l − 1{ Vt+l< Ft+l}λ)] =  Vt(l).
Hence,  Vt(k) ≥  Vt(l), which completes the proof for the ﬁrst part.
To prove the second part of the proposition, suppose the ﬁrm has zero net worth in period
t. Then both current and subsequent restructuring is inevitable since the face value of bonds
must exceed the maximum possible payoﬀ of the project, that is Ft+m =s u pXt+m >V t+m
for all m ≥ 1. Therefore, the face value of maturing bonds is no longer a state variable.
The choice of optimal maturity must also be independent of the state. The value function
is constant and is given by
 V (m)=P r ( m)Et[e





Note that the value function is increasing in m, which completes the proof of the second
part.
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